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In this paper I consider a small economy facing accession to a trade agree-
ment. Before accession the government has control over trade and environ-
mental policy. After accession it retains control over environmental policy but
has to allow free trade. Through the analysis I highlight an eﬀect of free trade
neglected in the literature so far. Adoption of free trade shifts the economic
incidence of pollution tax from consumers onto producers of the polluting good.
Under fairly plausible conditions, this change in incidence can reduce the dis-
tortion in pollution tax. Even though the choice of accession is inﬂuenced by
special interest groups, I ﬁnd that accession can be accompanied by an im-
provement in pollution policy and an increase in aggregate welfare.
1 Introduction
T h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt r a d ea n dt h ee n v i r o n m e n ti so fi m m e n s ec o n c e r nt o d a y .
Environmentalists fear that without international coordination, governments will sac-
riﬁce environmental quality and the welfare of their citizens to become globally com-
petitive.
Economic theory often supports these fears. Bhagwati (1971) shows that if free
trade is adopted in the presence of a domestic policy distortion, welfare can fall.1
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1Also see Pethig (1976), and Siebert (1977) for similar analysis of the eﬀects of free trade on
aggregate welfare.
1Beghin et al. (1997), and Ederington (2001) show that in the presence of an interna-
tional trade policy distortion, exogenous trade liberalization brings about a reduction
in pollution tax. Assuming open access in the harvest of a natural resource (similar
to a distortion in environmental policy) Brander and Taylor (1997 and 1998), and
Chichilnisky (1994) demonstrate a reduction in welfare when free trade is adopted.2
In this paper I reconsider the eﬀects of choosing free trade on an economy with
distorted domestic policy.
A small economy faces accession to a trade agreement. The government of this
economy is inﬂuenced by special interest groups and consequently, trade and pollution
policy are subject to special interest induced distortions. Accession provides greater
market access to other members, but takes away control over trade policy. Before
accession, the government has full control over both trade and pollution policy. After
accession, it retains control over pollution policy, but must allow free trade in all
goods.
I ﬁnd that accession to the agreement (adoption of free trade) need not reduce
aggregate welfare. I provide plausible conditions under which the choice of free trade
is accompanied by an improvement in pollution policy and a gain in aggregate wel-
fare. This gain in welfare occurs even if the economy exports the polluting good.
Through the analysis I highlight an eﬀect of free trade neglected in the literature
so far. Adoption of free trade shifts the economic incidence of pollution tax from
consumers onto producers of the polluting good. This change in incidence can reduce
the distortion in pollution tax.
Before accession, both trade and pollution policy are used to redistribute income
to special interest groups. With any increase in the pollution tax the government
also increases the ‘nominal rate of protection’ on the polluting good. This increase in
protection partially oﬀsets the loss in proﬁts from the increase in pollution tax. It also
transfers some of the incidence of pollution tax onto consumers of the polluting good.
Once free trade is adopted, the rate of protection cannot be altered and domestic
prices are exogenously given. As trade policy can no longer be used to redistribute
income, the marginal burden of pollution tax on producers rises. This causes pollution
to be more responsive to increases in tax. Under fairly plausible assumptions, higher
responsiveness of pollution to pollution tax raises overall lobbying for an increase in
pollution tax, and induces the government to raise the pollution tax. In addition, if
the price for the polluting good under free trade is higher than the domestic price
before free trade, free trade also brings about a gain in aggregate welfare.
There is some empirical support for the above result. In the formerly Centrally
Planned Economies, Vukina et al. (1999) found that liberalization in trade and foreign
2It is not possible to present a clear consensus on the welfare eﬀe c t so ff r e et r a d ei nt h ep r e s e n c e
of environmental distortions. This eﬀect depends on the pattern of trade and the stringency of
environmental regulation. However, it is often demonstrated that if environmental policy does not
internalize the pollution externality completely, and the country exports the polluting good on
adopting free trade, aggregate welfare can fall.
2exchange steered manufacturing output towards less-polluting sectors. The authors
link this improvement in composition to environmental policy reforms that accom-
panied trade reforms. Antweiler et al. (2001) estimate the scale, composition and
technique eﬀect from trade and ﬁnd that freer trade appears to reduce pollution. The
authors demonstrate that freer trade brings about an adjustment of environmental
policy, and can improve the environment.
Under diﬀerent settings, earlier studies have shown an improvement in endogenous
environmental policy when free trade is adopted. Alpay (2000), and Rauscher (1994)
highlight the incentive to tighten environmental policy on exported goods to favorably
inﬂuence world prices. In contrast, the economy considered in this paper is small.
Domestic policy cannot inﬂuence world prices or the terms of trade. Improvements
in pollution policy stem solely from a change in its incidence.
Bagwell and Staiger (2000) show that a country adjusts labor standards when in-
ternational trade is permitted. The authors show how free trade reduces the economic
incidence of the labor standard on consumers, but increases it on the producers of
the good. Thus if the gain from trade is extra consumer surplus, the labor standard
is tightened (an importing country). If instead the gain from trade is extra producer
surplus, the labor standard is relaxed (an exporting country). In Bagwell and Staiger
(2000) the labor standard maximizes aggregate welfare, and the country always gains
from trade. In this paper, the pollution tax is distorted to favor the producers of
the polluting good and international trade need not always raise welfare. Due to
this diﬀerence, unlike Bagwell and Staiger (2000) I do not focus on the variation in
pollution tax. Instead, I present conditions under which free trade is accompanied by
a reduction in the policy distortion, and a gain in aggregate welfare. I also ﬁnd that
this gain occurs irrespective of whether the good is imported or exported.
McAusland (2002) and Yu (1999) also incorporate a change in the incidence of
pollution policy from free trade. Comparing the two polar cases of free trade and
autarky the authors ﬁnd that free trade worsens the ineﬃciency in pollution policy.
Pollution policy in free trade is further from the welfare maximizing ideal than it was
under autarky. In this paper I diﬀerentiate the change in incidence of pollution policy
from free trade into two components. The ﬁrst is the eﬀect on consumer and producer
surplus (from consumption and production of the polluting good), and the other is the
eﬀect on responsiveness of pollution to pollution tax. I show that depending on the
relative magnitude of these two eﬀects pollution policy may improve or deteriorate
as free trade is adopted. In McAusland (2002) and Yu (1999) the eﬀect on consumer
a n dp r o d u c e rs u r p l u sa l w a y so u t w e i g h st h ee ﬀect from increased responsiveness. This
implies that pollution policy always deteriorates once free trade is adopted.
Copeland (1990) presents a comprehensive analysis of how domestic policies can
substitute for trade barriers, once trade barriers are prohibited by a trade agree-
ment. Considering two large economies that cooperatively negotiate the terms of
their agreement he argues that governments negotiate trade agreements mindful of
the domestic policy distortions created in their response. The author shows that
3despite the substitution of environmental policy for trade policy, and the presence
of domestic policy distortions, a bilaterally negotiated trade liberalization can raise
aggregate welfare. In this paper, I consider a small economy which can choose to
join or reject a multilateral trade agreement, but cannot inﬂuence the terms oﬀered.
Similar to Copeland (1990) I ﬁnd that despite the substitution of pollution policy
for trade policy to redistribute income to special interests, and the presence of policy
distortions, accession to the trade agreement can raise aggregate welfare.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present the analytical frame-
work for the paper. Characteristics of pollution policy when the government is re-
stricted in its choice of trade policy are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, I present
the characteristics of pollution policy when the government has complete control over
its trade policy. Section 5 brings the results from previous sections together to ana-
lyze the pollution policy and welfare impacts of choosing free trade over endogenously
chosen trade policy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Analytical Framework
I present an extension of the common agency model of government3 from Grossman
and Helpman (1994). In a small economy producing three goods, one generates
pollution as a by-product, while the other two do not. Utility of all individuals is
reduced by pollution. The government regulates pollution by a pollution tax and
regulates international trade by either a quantitative restriction (import or export
quota), or a tariﬀ.
There are three groups of people: the owners of labor, the owners of sector-speciﬁc
polluting capital, and the owners of sector-speciﬁc non-polluting capital.4 Im a i n t a i n
the (now) standard assumption in political economy models of international trade
that owners of speciﬁc factors are organized as special interests, while labor owners
are not.
2.1 Basics
There is one ‘numeraire’ good (denoted y0) and there are two ‘non-numeraire’ goods
(denoted y1 and y2). Good y0 is produced by a constant returns to scale technology
3Common agency refers to the situation where several principals exert inﬂuence on a single agent
to perform a costly action. The government in a common agency model serves as an agent for
special interest groups and the general public. Common agency was ﬁrst analyzed by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) and was subsequently popularized in models of international trade by Grossman
and Helpman (1994).
4Polluting capital by itself does not create pollution. The two forms of capital are named so
only to diﬀe r e n t i a t et h e ma ss p e c i ﬁc factors employed in two diﬀerent industries, polluting and
non-polluting.












The world and domestic price for good y0 is normalized to one and is thus referred to
as the numeraire good. In any equilibrium involving production of the numeraire, the
wage rate (w) equals one. Positive production of the numeraire is assumed through-
out.
Good y1 the non-polluting good represents ﬁnal goods and services that produce
negligible amounts of pollution in their production. It is produced by a constant
returns to scale and convex technology using two inputs: sector speciﬁc non-polluting
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and domestic price is denoted p1. The return to owners of non-polluting capital is











Restricted proﬁt functions are positively linearly homogeneous, and convex in prices
(p1,w). They also satisfy Hotelling’s lemma. Output equals the partial derivative of
the restricted proﬁt function with respect to output price (y1 = πh
p (.) where subscripts
denote partial derivatives).
Production of the polluting good y2 produces pollution (z)a sab y - p r o d u c t .T h e
two outputs y2 and z are produced by a constant returns to scale and convex technol-
ogy using two inputs: sector speciﬁc polluting capital (k), and labor (l2). The input















and domestic price is denoted p2. Return to the owners of polluting capital is repre-











where t is the tax rate on pollution. Using Hotelling’s Lemma output of the polluting
good is y2 = πk
p (p2,t), and pollution produced is z = −πk
t (p2,t).
Utility is assumed quasi-linear in form. Sub-utility functions for non-numeraire
goods are denoted ui (.),i=1 ,2, and are assumed strictly increasing and concave.
Damage from pollution is linearly separable and is represented by a strictly increasing
















5Each individual is endowed with a single unit of labor and total population is
normalized to 1. Income is a combination of wages, proﬁts and government transfers.
Government transfers comprise of pollution tax revenues, tariﬀ revenues, and rents
from import or export quotas. Pollution tax revenues are distributed proportionately
to all individuals. Quota rents, and tariﬀ revenues are distributed proportionately to
the consumers of the regulated good. Total tax revenue is tz, total tariﬀ revenue or
quota rents are
P
i (pi − piw)mi,w h e r epiw is the world price, and mi is the import
level for good i.
Individuals owning only labor (group l) are in proportion nl.G r o u p l does not




























where λ ∈ [0,1] is an exogenous parameter that alters group l’s consumption of the
polluting good (group consumption is λx2 (p2)).
Owners of polluting and non polluting capital are organized into two lobby groups
(h and k). Each group oﬀers the government contributions to inﬂuence policy. Their

















[(p2 − p2w)m2 + γ2 (p2)]






where πj is the restricted proﬁt function. Each group’s welfare net of contributions
is Ωj = Wj − Cj,w h e r eCj is contribution to the government.
2.2 Market Equilibrium
I present market equilibrium conditions only for the polluting good. Corresponding
conditions for the non-polluting good can be put together analogously.
Quantitative restrictions and tariﬀs are available as trade policy. If domestic
price in autarky (a condition of no international trade) is higher than the world price,
either an import quota or an import tariﬀ can be used to restrict imports. If the
government’s objective is to promote imports, an import subsidy can be provided.
If domestic price in autarky is lower than the world price, either an export quota or
export tax can be used to restrict exports. To promote exports an export subsidy can
be provided. Note that quantitative restrictions can only restrict imports or exports.
Let ¯ m2 denote a quantitative restriction for the polluting good (¯ m2 ≥ 0 for an














In equilibrium, domestic demand for the polluting good is no greater than net do-
mestic supply. Under a binding quantitative restriction, equation (3) holds with
6equality.5
Assuming a binding quantitative restriction diﬀerentiate equation (3) with respect





p (p2) − πk
pp (p2,t)
< 0. (4)
An exogenous marginal increase in the import quota, or a reduction in the export
quota causes a reduction in the price of the polluting good.
Let τ2 denote an ad-valorem tariﬀ for the polluting good (τ2 ≥ 0 for an import
tariﬀ or export subsidy, and τ2 ≤ 0 for an export tax, or import subsidy — all measured









The government chooses a trade policy instrument (either a tariﬀ or a quantitative
restriction) and its level for each good. Given two non-numeraire goods, and two
possible trade instruments for each good, there are four distinct trade regimes to
choose from. A trade regime is denoted R ∈ {Rττ,R τm,R mm,R mτ} where the ﬁrst
superscript denotes trade policy for the non-polluting good, and the second for the
polluting good (for example, Rτm is a regime with a tariﬀ for the non-polluting good,
and a quantitative restriction for the polluting good (τ1,m 2)). The government also
chooses the level of pollution tax.
Let τ = {τ1,τ2} denote the list of tariﬀs, and ¯ m = {¯ m1, ¯ m2} denote the list of
quantitative restrictions. W (t,τ, ¯ m,R)=
P
g∈{h,k,l} Wg denotes aggregate (gross of
contributions) welfare in the economy and Cj (t,τ, ¯ m,R) denotes lobby group j’s con-
tribution schedule.6 Contribution schedules and group welfare functions are assumed
diﬀerentiable in all continuous policy instruments (t, ¯ m1, ¯ m2,τ1,τ2).T h e g o v e r n -
ment’s objective function is a weighted sum of contributions and aggregate welfare





j (t,τ, ¯ m,R)+aW (t,τ, ¯ m,R). (5)
Policy is determined as a sub-game perfect outcome of a two stage noncooperative
game. In the ﬁrst stage, lobbies simultaneously choose their political contribution
5For an import quota to bind it should be smaller in value than the quota where domestic price
equals world price. For an export quota to bind it should be larger in value than the quota where
domestic price equals world price. Formally, let p2 ¡
¯ m2,t
¢
be the implicit price function obtained




= p2w. A import quota for the polluting good is binding if 0 ≤ ¯ m2 < ˜ m2,a n da ne x p o r t
quota for the polluting good is binding if 0 ≥ ¯ m2 > ˜ m2.
6Cj (.) ≥ 0 to ensure that lobby groups cannot use this function to extract payments from the
government.
7schedules so as to maximize their net of contributions group utility (Ωj). In the
second stage, the government takes contribution schedules as given, and sets policy
to maximize its own welfare.
Proposition 1 Conditions for a political equilibrium (Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
& Grossman and Helpman(1994)):
³
{Cj0 (t0,τ0, ¯ m0,R 0)}j∈J ,t 0,τ0, ¯ m0,R 0
´
is a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of the environmental policy game if and only if condi-
tions C1-C4 hold. (C1) Contribution Schedule Cj0 (t0,τ0, ¯ m0,R 0) and policy vector












j0 (t,τ, ¯ m,R)+aW (t,τ, ¯ m,R)
)
.







=a r gm a x
½
Wj0 (t,τ, ¯ m,R) − Cj00 (t,τ, ¯ m,R)+ P
j∈J Cj0 (t,τ, ¯ m,R)+aW (t,τ, ¯ m,R)
¾
.















j0 (t,τ, ¯ m,R)+aW (t,τ, ¯ m,R)
)
Condition (C1) stipulates feasible contribution schedules (non-negative, and no
greater than aggregate welfare of lobby members) and policy vectors. Condition (C2)
states that the government sets pollution policy to maximize its own welfare. Condi-
tion (C3) stipulates eﬃciency in the relation between the government and each lobby
involved in the political process; it requires the optimal tax to maximize their joint
welfare. Finally, condition (C4) requires that there exist an alternate tax schedule,
and choice of trade policy; the next best option for the government, in case it wishes
to cut out any particular lobby from the political process.7.













































7See Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a more detailed explanation and discussion of these
conditions.






















Equations ((6), (7) and (8)) illustrate the eﬀect of lobbying activity. The optimal
pollution tax/trade policy maximizes a weighted welfare function where the welfare
of the lobby groups gets a higher weight ((1 + a)) than that of unorganized citizens
(a). This maximization results in a policy that is systematically diﬀerent from policy
that maximizes aggregate welfare.
3 Restricted Trade Policy
I present a restricted version of the political model from Section 2. The government
can choose from a quantitative restriction or tariﬀ for each non-numeraire good.
However, the level of quantitative restriction, or tariﬀ, is determined exogenously.
The results from this section link forward to Section 5, where I explicitly consider
this economy’s decision to join a multilateral trade agreement. As the multilateral
agreement takes away control over trade policy, accession is similar to choosing a
regime where trade policy levels are exogenously determined.
Before proceeding to politically determined policy I present the benchmark of
aggregate welfare maximizing trade and pollution policy.
Aggregate Welfare Maximizing Policy Aggregate welfare is W (.)=
P
g∈{l,h,k} Wg.
As the economy is small, welfare maximizing trade policy is free trade (all tariﬀse q u a l
zero). The corresponding welfare maximizing tax schedule equals marginal damage
from pollution. Formally,
t
∗ = vz (z). (9)
3.1 The Pollution Tax under Quantitative Restrictions
Assume that an exogenously speciﬁed binding quantitative restriction is chosen to reg-
ulate trade in the polluting good (R0 ∈ {Rτm,R mm}). Also assume that an increase
in pollution tax reduces the equilibrium output of the polluting good (−πk
pt > 0).
Given that the level of quantitative restriction is exogenously determined, diﬀeren-









pp (p2,t) − x2
p (p2)
¤ > 0. (10)
When the pollution tax is raised, domestic supply of the polluting good falls. To
restore parity between net domestic demand and supply, equilibrium price rises. An
9increase in domestic price when the pollution tax rises implies that producers can
transfer some of the increase in pollution tax onto the consumers of their good. This
ability to transfer an increase in pollution tax eﬀects the optimal pollution tax chosen
under quantitative restrictions. I illustrate this in the lemma below.
Lemma 1 When the optimal trade policy for the polluting good is a binding quanti-
tative restriction (R0 ∈ {Rτm,R mm}) the optimal pollution tax is
t















Lemma 1 illustrates how the government trades oﬀ social welfare to favor special
interest groups. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (11) (vz (z))i sm a r -
ginal social damage from pollution. The second term reﬂects the government’s policy
compromise to special interest groups. The numerator measures the loss in aggregate
special interest welfare from an increase in pollution tax. This loss is the increase in
pollution tax payments returned to the owners of labor (nlπk
t)l e s st h ea m o u n tt r a n s -




dt ).T h e
denominator normalizes the loss in aggregate special interest welfare by the weighted















eral equilibrium responsiveness of pollution to pollution tax. If the responsiveness of
pollution to pollution tax is very high any deviation of pollution tax from marginal
social damage causes large ﬂuctuations in pollution, and subsequently large losses in
aggregate welfare. Thus, high responsiveness induces the government to set pollution
tax closer to marginal social damage.8 However, when responsiveness of pollution is
ﬁnite and aggregate special interest losses from an increase in pollution tax are non-









≤ 0,t m <v z (z).
Proof. Please see Appendix A.1.
Whether the optimal pollution tax is greater or less than marginal social damage
depends on the sign of the second term in equation (11). The denominator of this
term is positive. A suﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o rt h en u m e r a t o rt ob en e g a t i v ei st h a tt h e









< 0). If polluting industry proﬁts fall when the pollution tax is raised









→∞pollution tax equals aggregate welfare maximizing tax.
10A tax lower than marginal social damage is the result of a political process. Due
to lobbying activity the government assigns a higher weight to the welfare of the
producers of pollution than that assigned to losses from pollution to the unorganized.
Since a part of the externality from pollution is the disutility to this group the optimal
t a xn e v e rf u l l yr e ﬂects their losses. Corollary 1 is an illustration of incomplete envi-
ronmental policy, that is, a policy that does not completely account for the beneﬁts
and costs associated with an environmental resource.
3.2 The Pollution Tax under Tariﬀs
Now assume that the government chooses a tariﬀ to regulate trade in the polluting
good (R0 ∈ {Rττ,R mτ}). Under an exogenous tariﬀ (in a small economy) the pol-
lution tax does not eﬀect the domestic price of the polluting good. This is unlike
the case of an exogenously given binding quantitative restriction. In that case the
owners of polluting capital could transfer a part of the incidence of pollution tax onto
consumers of the polluting good. They cannot do so under tariﬀs.
The optimal pollution tax under tariﬀsi sg i v e nb yt h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a .
Lemma 2 When the optimal trade policy for the polluting good is a tariﬀ (R0 ∈
{Rττ,R mτ}) the optimal pollution tax is
t


























The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d ei sm a r g i n a ls o c i a ld a m a g ef r o mp o l l u t i o n .
The second term is the government’s policy compromise to special interest groups.
The numerator is the loss in aggregate special interest welfare from an increase in
pollution tax, which is now, the entire net tax burden (nlπk
t). The denominator is the
weighted responsiveness of pollution to pollution tax, which is higher under tariﬀs
than quantitative restrictions. As an increase in tax can no longer be transferred onto
consumers through an increase in price its marginal burden on the producers of the
polluting good is higher. A higher marginal burden induces a greater reduction in
the output of pollution when pollution tax is raised.
The third term on the right hand side of equation (12) depends directly on the
degree of tariﬀ protection granted to the polluting good. This term reﬂects the use
of the pollution tax as a second-best tool to reduce the impact of an exogenous trade
distortion (also an attempt to optimize either tariﬀ revenues, or subsidy payouts). An
increase in pollution tax reduces domestic production of the polluting good, which
at a ﬁxed price either increases imports, or reduces exports. If the polluting good
is protected (τ2 > 0 ⇒ (p2 − p2w) > 0), the pollution tax is adjusted upwards. If
the polluting good is discriminated against (τ2 < 0), the pollution tax is adjusted
downwards.
11This result is related to earlier papers. Ederington (2001), Krutilla (1991), and
Markusen (1975) analyze welfare maximizing domestic policy in the presence of mul-
tiple environmental, and trade distortions. They all ﬁnd that when tariﬀ policy is
exogenous, domestic policy is adjusted to correct for trade distortions.
It is interesting to note that in the presence of exogenously speciﬁed quantitative
restrictions (see Lemma 1) the pollution tax is not used as a second-best trade instru-
ment. Similar results are found in Copeland (1994), and Corden and Falvey (1985).
In both these papers, a quota prevents the spill-over of a distortion to other sectors.
I no u rc a s e ,t h ep r e s e n c eo fab i n d i n gt r a d eq u o t ai m p l i e st h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tc a n n o t
use pollution policy to alter the quantity imported, or exported, and thus cannot use
domestic policy to correct for the trade distortion.
In equation (12) the diﬀerence between pollution tax and marginal social damage
is a linear function of the diﬀerence between the domestic price and world price for
the polluting good. This observation is useful for cross-good comparisons. All else
being equal, if among two goods one has the same domestic price owing to greater
tariﬀ protection, that good will also have a higher pollution tax.
For the same good it is useful to look at the comparative statics of pollution tax
to changes in the exogenous tariﬀ. These comparative statics depend on third order
derivatives of the proﬁt and utility functions for the polluting good. If we assume
that the third order derivatives are negligible the following proposition results.
Proposition 2 Assume that all third order derivatives for πk (p2,t) equal zero. Fur-
ther assume that x2




is suﬃcient for d
dp2tτ ≥ 0,a n d d
dp2 [tτ − vz] ≥ 0.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.1.





deﬁnition the parameter nl ≤ 1,t h u sa ≥ 1 is suﬃcient for all nl in the above
proposition. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) provide a 95% conﬁdence interval for the
estimate of a i nt h el i t e r a t u r ew h e r ea ∈ [32.33,99].9 B a s e do nt h i se s t i m a t et h e
assumption that a ≥ 1 seems plausible.
Like in Proposition 2, Bommer and Schulze (1999) ﬁnd that an increase in the price
of the polluting good increases the stringency of environmental regulation. However,
unlike Proposition 2, Fredriksson (1997) ﬁnds that an increase in the price of the
polluting good reduces the pollution tax.10
9Goldberg and Maggi (1999) empirically estimate a government welfare function G =
(1 − β)
P
j∈J Cj (.)+βW (.) based on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for US data. They ﬁnd a
95% conﬁdence interval for β ∈ [0.97,0.99]. In our model a =
β
(1−β); thus based on the Golberg and
Maggi estimate a ∈ [32.33,99].
10Fredriksson’s result is driven by the assumption that marginal social damage from pollution is
constant at all pollution levels but polluting industry beneﬁts from pollution rise with the price of










τ − vz] ≥ 0. (13)
A st h ei m p o r tt a r i ﬀ or the export subsidy for the polluting good is exogenously
reduced the pollution tax falls. Further, this fall moves the pollution tax further
away from marginal social damage. In other words, trade liberalization can have a
deleterious impact on pollution policy.
Equation (13) illustrates the concern that environmental policy may be used as
a secondary trade barrier. If a trade agreement mandates reduction in import tariﬀs
the government may allow domestic producers a reduction in pollution policy (or
some other domestic policy not governed by the agreement). Such concerns were ﬁrst
raised by the second-best analyses of trade and environmental distortions listed above.
More recently these concerns have also been analyzed in empirical work by Levinson
and Taylor (2001), and Ederington and Minier (2001). Ederington and Minier (2001)
ﬁnd evidence of the use of environmental regulation as a secondary means to provide
protection to domestic industries. In their analysis of US environmental policy, the
authors ﬁnd that regulation is lower in industries with higher net imports. However,
they also ﬁnd it to be higher for industries with higher tariﬀs which contradicts the
above result.
3.2.1 The Pollution Tax under Free Trade: The Post Accession Economy
Now assume that this country accedes to a multilateral trade agreement which re-
quires free trade, but allows full control on pollution policy.
Free trade is equivalent to a trade regime where all tariﬀrates equal zero ({τ1,τ2} =
0). Like the case of an exogenously given tariﬀ, a change in the pollution tax has
no eﬀect on the domestic price of the polluting good. The corresponding optimal
pollution tax is characterized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 When the optimal trade regime is free trade the optimal pollution tax is
t










The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (14) is marginal social dam-
age from pollution. The second term reﬂects the government’s policy compromise to
special interest groups. The numerator measures the loss in aggregate special inter-
est welfare from an increase in pollution tax and the denominator is the weighted
responsiveness of pollution to pollution tax.
The second term in the right hand side of equation (14) is negative. This leads
to the following corollary.
Corollary 2 tF <v z (z).
13The optimal pollution tax in free trade is smaller in value than marginal social
damage from pollution. In other words, even under free trade, the externality from
pollution is not completely internalized by pollution policy.
4 Unrestricted Trade Policy: The Pre-Accession
Economy
In this section I characterize pollution and trade policy prior to accession to a mul-
tilateral trade agreement. Before joining the trade agreement the government has
full control on trade and environmental policy (formally this requires me to relax
the restrictions imposed on trade policy in the previous section). The results from
this section constitute the starting point for the economy as it considers accession to
the multilateral trade agreement. They also link forward to the next section where I
explicitly consider the government’s choice of accession to a multilateral trade agree-
ment.
Trade policy is expressed as a nominal rate of protection, which is the proportional
change in domestic price directly brought about by the trade policy instrument. The
quantitative restriction can be either an import or an export quota. A binding import
quota raises the domestic price over the world price while a binding export quota
lowers domestic price below the world price. An import quota results in a positive
nominal rate of protection, while an export quota results in a negative rate. If instead
at a r i ﬀ is chosen, an import tariﬀ, or an export subsidy raises the domestic price above
the world price implying positive nominal protection. An import subsidy, or export
t a xl o w e r sd o m e s t i cp r i c eb e l o wt h ew o r l dp r i c ei m p l y i n gn e g a t i v en o m i n a lp r o t e c t i o n .
I present results for the polluting good alone. The optimal pollution tax when
trade policy is unrestricted is
t




















Equation (15) has the same form as equation (11) which was the optimal pollution
tax when the polluting good is regulated with a binding quantitative restriction.
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (15) is marginal social damage
from pollution. The second term reﬂects the government’s policy compromise to
special interest groups. The numerator measures the loss in aggregate special interest
welfare from an increase in pollution tax. Which includes the increase in pollution
tax payments returned to the owners of labor (nlπk
t) less the amount transferred










p]). The denominator normalizes the loss in aggregate special interest
14welfare by the weighted responsiveness of pollution to pollution tax.
Like the case of a binding quantitative restriction when trade policy is unrestricted
a portion of the increase in pollution tax is transferred onto consumers of the polluting
good. I ﬁnd that all else being equal, any increase in the pollution tax also increases
the nominal rate of protection (see the Appendix A.1 for an explanation). There are
two instruments available to redistribute income to special interest groups: pollution
and trade policy. An increase in pollution tax implies a loss in proﬁts to the owners
of polluting capital. To partially oﬀset this loss, nominal protection on the polluting
good is raised. However, this increase in nominal protection also transfers some of
the incidence of pollution tax onto the consumers of the polluting good.


































All else being equal the polluting good has higher nominal protection if a higher
proportion is consumed by unorganized consumers ( λnl
(1−nl)+λnlπk
p) and has lower pro-
tection if pollution produced (πk
t)i sh i g h e r .
The equality of nominal rates of protection, and pollution tax is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume both pollution tax and the level of trade policy (tariﬀs, or
quantitative restrictions) are chosen endogenously. If the optimal tariﬀ is not an
import or an export subsidy, then i) the equilibrium pollution tax (t0 = tm = tτ)a n d
ii)the nominal rate of protection ((p2−p2w)
p2 ) are constant across a tariﬀ or quantitative
restriction for good 2.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.1.
In other words, tariﬀs and quotas are equivalent even when all policy is politically
determined. Note that an important reason why tariﬀs and quantitative restrictions
diﬀer has been assumed away. In this model tariﬀs revenues and quota rents are
distributed equally among the consumers of each regulated good. If quota rents
are distributed diﬀerently than tariﬀ revenues (for example to a group of importers,
or to the producers of the polluting good (as under the US dairy quotas (Feenstra
(1992)) equilibrium trade protection, and subsequently the equilibrium pollution tax
would diﬀer across tariﬀs and quantitative restrictions (see for an example, Maggi
and Rodríguez-Claire (2000)).
155 Choosing Free Trade over Endogenously Deter-
mined Trade Policy
Now consider the choice of joining either a regional, or global multilateral trade
agreement. If the country is small and has limited inﬂuence in setting the trade
agreement’s agenda, joining the trade agreement is similar to adopting exogenously
determined trade policy.11
Consider such a small country facing accession to a trade agreement with the
explicit goal of free trade. The beneﬁt of accession is increased market access to
other members of the trade agreement (modelled as a set of new goods prices). Be-
fore accession trade and pollution policy are endogenously chosen. After accession
the government retains control over domestic pollution policy, but cannot have any
barriers to international trade.
Using the results from previous sections, I evaluate the potential environmental
policy, and welfare impacts of joining such a trade agreement.
Considering accession to the trade agreement requires minor adjustments to the
analytical framework and notation. Accession to the agreement, or free trade is
denoted as F. Trade policy under free trade is restricted. The possibility of accession
adds another trade regime to the four listed in Section 2.3. Now the optimal trade
regime R ∈ {Rττ,R τm,R mm,R mτ,F},w h e r ei nt h eﬁrst four regimes trade policy
is endogenously determined. Superscript m denotes a variable in the pre-accession
trade equilibrium (with endogenously chosen trade policy in the polluting good).
Thus, tm denotes pollution tax, zm is level of pollution, Wgm is group welfare (where
g ∈ {l,h,k}), Wm is aggregate welfare, Gm is government welfare, and ﬁnally p2m is
domestic price of the polluting good. These variables constitute the starting point
from which free trade is adopted. Superscript F is also attached to all variables in
free trade, tF,z F,WgF,WF, GF are the corresponding levels in free trade. The world
price for the polluting good available after accession is denoted p2F.T h i sp r i c en e e d
n o te q u a lt h ew o r l dp r i c e( p2w) available before accession. To isolate the impact of
free trade from a change in the price of the polluting good, I assume that the non-
polluting good has no trade barriers before accession, and also that its world price is
constant before and after accession.
I ﬁrst consider how the choice of free trade aﬀects the pollution tax. To this
end I compare two pollution tax schedules. The ﬁrst is the tax schedule when trade
11Consider accession to the World Trade Organization as an example. During a period before
accession, market access to current members, and rules for accession are negotiated. Further, most
new policies are ﬁnalized only after negotiations with all members. Despite the World Trade Or-
ganization’s democratic nature, it is well accepted that the bargaining power of small economies
is considerably smaller than the larger economies. Also as there are currently 144 members of the
World Trade Organization, a single small economy usually does not have considerable impact on
the negotiated policy (please see http://www.wto.org for more details).
16policy on the polluting good is endogenously determined (tm) .T h es e c o n di st h et a x
schedule under free trade (tF).
Recall that both tax schedules (tF and tm) are determined in part by special
interest contributions and are lower in value than the marginal social damage from
pollution (see corollaries 1 and 2). Both special interest tax schedules diverge from
marginal social damage by a ratio that reﬂects the government’s trade oﬀ between
special interest proﬁts and aggregate welfare (see equations (11), (15) and (14)). This
ratio divides the loss in aggregate special interest welfare from an increase in pollution
tax by the weighted responsiveness of pollution to pollution tax. On adopting free
trade both the loss in aggregate special interest welfare, and the responsiveness of
pollution to pollution tax can change.
The loss in aggregate special interest welfare changes due to a change in the
economic incidence of pollution tax. When trade policy is endogenously chosen, the
producers of the polluting good can transfer some of the incidence of pollution tax
onto their consumers (see discussion after equations (11), and (15)). When some
of the polluting good is consumed by unorganized consumers the entire burden of
pollution tax is not borne by special interests. Under free trade this transfer is no
longer possible. The producers of pollution now bear the entire pollution tax. This
change in incidence implies that the loss in special interest welfare from an increase
in the pollution tax is at least as large under free trade than before.
A change in economic incidence is also responsible for an increase in the respon-
siveness of pollution to pollution tax. Under free trade the marginal burden from an
increase in pollution tax on the producers of the polluting good is higher. A higher
marginal burden causes a greater reduction in the output of pollution when pollution
tax is raised. In other words the responsiveness of pollution to pollution tax increases
in free trade. This increase in responsiveness when free trade is adopted is termed
the eﬃciency eﬀect (of free trade) (the pollution tax is now more eﬃcient in reducing
pollution).
When free trade is adopted the increase in special interest welfare losses exerts a
downward pressure on pollution tax and increases its divergence from marginal social
damage. Meanwhile, the eﬃciency eﬀect, exerts an upwards pressure on pollution
tax, decreasing its divergence from marginal social damage. Relative magnitudes
determine whether a change in economic incidence causes pollution policy to move
closer to, or further from, marginal social damage.





























The left hand side of equation (17) is the ratio of special interest losses in free trade
to those before accession. The right hand side is the corresponding ratio of pollution
17responsiveness (greater than one). If the ratio of special interest losses is smaller than





tt denote the partial equilibrium elasticity of pollution to pollution




p denote the partial equilibrium elasticity of polluting good
output to pollution tax. Assume, for now, that the elasticity of pollution to pollution
tax is higher than the elasticity of polluting good output to pollution tax (
εz,t
εy2,t ≥ 1)
and that the ratio of elasticities is constant. Under these conditions there exists a
critical value for group l’s consumption of the polluting good (˜ λ ∈ [0,1])a tw h i c h
t h ec h a n g ei ni n c i d e n c eh a sn oi m p a c to np o l l u t i o nt a xw h e nf r e et r a d ei sa d o p t e d .
At this critical value the ratio of aggregate special interest losses equals the ratio of










ε2,t ≥ 1 and is constant, also assume that the domestic
price of the polluting good is constant pre and post accession (p2m = p2F). i) If
λ>˜ λ, t∗ >t m >t F .i i )I fλ = ˜ λ, t∗ >t m = tF. iii)Finally if λ<˜ λ, t∗ >t F >t m
Proof. Please see Appendix A.1.
Assume a constant domestic price for the polluting good pre and post accession. If
consumption of the polluting good by unorganized consumers is less than the critical
value ˜ λ, the pollution tax under free trade is higher than the pollution tax before
accession (the eﬃciency eﬀect dominates). If consumption of the polluting good is
greater than the critical level, the pollution tax under free trade is smaller than the
pollution tax under quantitative restrictions. It is also further from marginal social
damage (the change in special interest losses dominates). Finally, if consumption
equals this critical level, the pollution tax under free trade equals the pollution tax
before accession.
In other words, the proportion of polluting good consumed by unorganized indi-
viduals determines the overall impact of a change in economic incidence on pollution
tax.
Now consider a special case where consumers in the unorganized group l do not
consume the polluting good (λ =0 ).12 This case is useful to consider for a number
of reasons. First, it allows us to isolate the eﬃciency eﬀe c to ff r e et r a d eo np o l l u -
tion policy. Second, it may also be realistic in modelling pollution generated in the
modern manufacturing sector. A majority of the most pollution-intensive industries
are intermediate good industries (see Hettige et al. (1992), (1995), and Stern et al.
(1997) for evidence). If the intermediate input using industry is organized as a special
12Note that as the amount of polluting good consumed by an unorganized consumer tends to zero
(λ → 0) the condition in equation (17) necessarily holds true.
18interest group the polluting good is not consumed by unorganized citizens.13 Low,
or negligible consumption of the polluting good by unorganized citizens is also real-
istic for some developing countries (like those in South Asia). In these countries the
urban rich have signiﬁcant inﬂuence in policy making. The urban rich also consume
a majority of manufactured products. The unrepresented poor live a subsistence
lifestyle, depend on mud and clay housing, subsistence agriculture, and have almost
no demands on the modern manufacturing sector.
Corollary 3 Assume a constant domestic price for good 2, p2F = p2m.I fλ =0 ,t h e n
t∗ >t F >t m.
Note that no restriction on production elasticities is required for the result in
Corollary 3 to hold. If only organized interests produce and consume the polluting
good (λ =0 ) there is no change in aggregate special interest proﬁts when free trade
is adopted. Nevertheless, lobbying is altered due to an increase in the eﬃciency of
pollution tax. Due to the increase in eﬃciency the government sets a higher pollution
tax and reduces its divergence from the socially optimal rate (t∗).14
Next I establish conditions under which accession to the multilateral trade agree-
ment brings about an increase in aggregate welfare.
Let ˜ p2 denote the world price where the pollution tax under free trade equals
the pollution tax prevailing before accession. Let tF0 (.), and tm0 (.) denote implicit










Assume that pollution tax under free trade rises when the price of the polluting good
rises, formally d
dp2tF0 (p2) ≥ 0. Under these conditions
p




In other words, if the world price for the polluting good is higher than the price where
pollution taxes are equal, the pollution tax in free trade is higher.
Lemma 4 If λ =0 , then ˜ p2 <p 2m
Lemma 4 states, if unorganized consumers do not consume the polluting good, the
price where pollution taxes are equal is lower than the domestic price before accession.
This result derives from Corollary 3 which shows that at a constant price for the
polluting good, when λ =0 , pollution tax in free trade is higher than the pollution
13With a pure intermediate good, λ =0 . A solution for this model with an intermediate good can
be requested from the author.
14For other analyses also incorporate a change in the incidence of pollution policy from free
trade see McAusland (2002) and Yu (1999). However, both McAusland (2002) and Yu (1999) only
highlight the eﬀect of changing special interest losses from adopting free trade.
19tax before accession. This implies that a reduction in the price after accession below
the price before accession lowers the pollution tax ( d
dp2t0
F (p2) ≥ 0) and brings it closer
to that before accession.
Using the notation above, I present the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If λ =0 , p2F ≥ ˜ p2,a n da c c e s s i o n( R = F)s a t i s ﬁes equilibrium
conditions C1-C4 from Proposition 1 then WF ≥ Wm.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.1.
The conditions λ =0and p2F ≥ ˜ p2 are suﬃcient to guarantee that aggregate
welfare (W) increases when the government chooses free trade. When unorganized
consumption of the polluting good is zero, and the post accession price ensures a
higher pollution tax, a country with endogenous but incomplete environmental policy
gains aggregate welfare from the adoption of free trade.
While the formal proof to Proposition 5 is somewhat tedious (see Appendix A.1)
the basic intuition is quite simple. When the pollution tax after accession is higher
than that before accession, pollution tax revenues rise faster than the increase in the
pollution externality. This implies that if unorganized consumers do not consume the
polluting good, their welfare rises as free trade is adopted. Under these conditions
a decline in aggregate welfare from adopting free trade has to derive from a decline
in aggregate special interest welfare. It also implies that this decline in aggregate
special interest welfare is larger than the gain in unorganized group welfare. However,
a decline in aggregate special interest welfare of this magnitude ensures that special
interest contributions are too small to induce a move to free trade.
To relate this result to domestic prices note that when unorganized members of
society do not consume the polluting good (λ =0 )the domestic price pre accession
is greater than the price where pollution taxes are equal (p2m ≥ ˜ p2, see lemma 4).
This implies that the condition that the post accession world price is higher than
pre accession domestic price also ensures a higher pollution tax post accession (as
p2F ≥ p2m ≥ ˜ p2). In other words a suﬃcient condition for a gain in aggregate welfare
from adopting free trade is that the domestic price for the polluting good rises after
adoption. This implies that even though the economy might export the polluting
good, aggregate welfare can rise as free trade is adopted.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Some earlier studies predict a decline in welfare from adopting free trade in the pres-
ence of a domestic policy distortion. These studies assume distortions are exogenously
given and do not allow any policy response to rising social damages from free trade.
They also do not specify a mechanism for the choice of free trade. This results in
a somewhat unrealistic scenario; the economy losing welfare from free trade cannot
choose to stay in economic isolation.
20In this paper I present a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between in-
ternational trade and environmental policy. Building on the assumption of special
interest politics all trade and pollution policy distortions are endogenized. A mecha-
nism for the choice of free trade is also speciﬁed. I present plausible conditions where
the choice of free trade improves pollution policy and brings about an increase in
aggregate welfare.
The improvement in welfare and pollution policy comes from a change in the
incidence of pollution tax. A change in incidence in pollution tax occurs when a
countries ability to inﬂuence the domestic price of the polluting good falls as free
trade is adopted. In this paper I consider the case of a small country. A small country
has no ability to inﬂuence domestic prices once free trade is adopted. However,
this assumption is not necessary for the results presented in the paper. Greater
competition and larger markets in free trade reduce the ability to inﬂuence domestic
prices even for large countries. 15
However, one needs to interpret the above results with caution. The proportion of
polluting good consumed by unorganized agents determines whether pollution policy
improves or deteriorates once free trade is adopted. This implies that an under-
standing of the type of good is important before one draws any conclusions from this
research.
Future research can extend this paper in both theoretical, and empirical directions.
One of the reasons why quantitative restrictions are chosen over tariﬀsi sb e c a u s e
special interests gain a larger share of quantitative restriction rents (see Maggi and
Rodríguez-Claire (2000)). An interesting extension would be to see how diﬀerent
distributions of rents from quantitative restriction inﬂuence environmental policy in
at a r i ﬀ, or quantitative restrictions equilibrium.
There are a few empirical hypotheses that derive from this paper. Ceteris paribus,
countries trading pollution intensive goods should have more stringent environmental
regulation than countries that impose barriers on the trade of such goods. Another
empirical hypothesis is, ceteris paribus, if among two goods one has greater exogenous
tariﬀ protection, that good will also have a higher pollution tax.
15There is only one extreme case where these results are not valid, when the country analyzed
is the sole producer and consumer of the polluting good. In this case the country has the same
inﬂuence on domestic prices before and after free trade is adopted.
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Proof to Corollary 1
The denominator of the second term in equation (11) is positive. Given that nl



































is the change in polluting industry proﬁts from an increase
in pollution tax. In other words, a decline in polluting industry proﬁts when the
pollution tax is raised is suﬃcient for the numerator of the second term in equation
(11) to be negative.
Proof to Proposition 2
















[1 − ft − gt]
(22)
24and
d[t − f (.)]
dp2 =
[gp (1 − ft)+fpgt]






























































































gt ≤ 1.T h i si m p l i e st h a t[fp + gp] ≥ 0 and [1 − ft − gt] ≥ 0.T h u s
∀a ∈
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d[t − f (.)]
dp2 ≥ 0.
Rates of nominal protection when trade policy is unrestricted and proof
to Proposition 3.
First consider an endogenously determined quantitative restriction (¯ m)o nt h e










p denote the elasticity of import demand for the polluting





































. All else being equal the polluting good has higher
nominal protection if: it has a lower elasticity of imports, a higher proportion of
25domestic production to imports, and a higher proportion is consumed by unorganized
consumers. It also has a higher nominal rate of protection if the tax rate on pollution
is higher.
Now consider the case of an endogenously determined tariﬀ (τ2) on the polluting
good. Let m2 (p2)=x2 (p2) − πk





m2(p2) denote the ratio of domestic production to imports, and e2 (p2)=
[−m2
p(p2)]p2
m2(p2) denote the elasticity of import demand for the non polluting good. The
























p2 [t − vz]
#
. (27)
The nominal rate of protection of the polluting good is equal to that under an en-
dogenously chosen quantitative restriction (compare equations (27) and (26)). All
else being equal, the polluting good has higher nominal protection if: it has a lower
elasticity of imports, a higher proportion of domestic production to imports, and a
higher proportion is consumed by unorganized consumers. It also has a higher nom-
inal rate of protection if the tax rate on pollution is higher. Both equations (26)
and (27) also demonstrate the use of tariﬀs as a second-best tool. Tariﬀsa r eu s e d
to correct for the environmental externality. If the pollution tax for the polluting
good is less than marginal social damage, nominal protection for the polluting good
is reduced. However if pollution tax is greater than marginal social damage, nominal
protection is increased.
When quantitative restrictions are chosen as the optimal trade policy the pol-
lution tax is determined by equation (11). When a tariﬀ is implemented for the
polluting good the pollution tax is determined by equation (12). For the case of a
tariﬀ substitute equilibrium tariﬀ protection (from equation (27)) into equation (12)
to obtain
t




















The tax rate on pollution under an optimally chosen tariﬀ i st h es a m ea st h a tu n d e r
an optimally chosen quantitative restriction (as the nominal rates of protection are
also equal).
Proof to Proposition 4
Assuming a ﬁxed price p2 three ﬁxed point solutions are graphed in t space (see
Figure 1). These are t∗ = ξ (p2,t ∗), tF = Θ
¡
p2,t F¢



































































































I illustrate the logic of the proof for case iii). Cases i) and ii) can be proved similarly.
If λ<˜ λ, at constant prices (p2,t) the following relationship holds true: ξ (p2,t) >
Θ(p2,t) >ζ(p2,t), in other words, at every tξ(.) lies above Θ(.) which lies above
ζ (.). Second order conditions guarantee that the curves intersect the 450 line t from
above.16 When λ<˜ λ Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the three tax rates.
Proof to Proposition 5.
This proof requires a series of lemmas before the main proof. I list them all below.





− [tmzm − v(zm)] ≥ 0.















Corollary 2 shows that vz
¡
zF¢













16In addition to the second order conditions we can verify that d
dt [ξ (p2,t)] = −πk
ttvzz < 0,t h u s
all three curves are downward sloping as drawn in the graph.

























Corollary 4 If λ =0&p2F ≥ ˜ p2;WlF − Wlm ≥ 0
Which further implies that






Another lemma used in the proof is
Lemma 6 Without any loss in generality assume that special interest group σ ∈
{h,k} prefers the quantitative restrictions equilibrium to free trade. Group σ’s con-











And then the ﬁnal proof for Proposition 5.
Proof. This proof shows that when λ =0and p2F ≥ ˜ p2, an improvement in aggregate
welfare (WF − Wm ≥ 0) is a necessary condition for the governments choice of free
trade.
Recall that free trade is the government’s equilibrium choice if and only if it
satisﬁes conditions C1-C4 from Proposition 1. Now assume that WF − Wm < 0.





< 0. If total special interest welfare
declines in free trade at least one special interest group must prefer the quantitative
restrictions equilibrium to free trade. Further, the total welfare losses for this group
have to be larger than the gains from free trade. In this setup there are only two
lobby groups, J = {h,k} which provides two possibilities.




< 0,∀j ∈ J. From equation (29) this requires that £
CjF − Cjm¤
















,i∈ J&i 6= σ. (30)
The condition in equation (30) cannot hold under the above conditions. The
term on the left hand side is negative (group σ loses welfare from free trade),
and both terms on the right hand side are positive.
282. In the second possibility one group (σ) loses welfare, and the other group




< 0 to hold the losses to group σ have to be larger than
















where the second inequality results from substituting the preference for free
trade for group i from Lemma 5. Even in this case for group σ, condition
C3 from Proposition 1 (see equation (30)) cannot hold. The left hand side








) is negative but is larger than the left hand side (see
equation (31)).
When λ =0 ,a n dp2F ≥ ˜ p2 a decline in aggregate welfare from choosing free trade
implies that free trade cannot be an equilibrium trade regime. Thus, if free trade was
chosen aggregate welfare must have improved upon choosing it.
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